



Ad-hoc & Sensor Networking for M2M Communications: *Threat Landscape and Good Practice Guide*

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
Terminology

- Machine-to-Machine (M2M)
- Ad-hoc and sensor networking (WMN, MANETs, WSN)
- Internet of Things (IoT)
- Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)




CPS: Cyber-Physical Systems
 DRTC: Distributed real-time control
 CE2E: Communicating end-to-end
 VAS: Value added services

Extension of the ETSI M2M architecture



Assets



Asset details

Assets

Domain

Domain

Assets

Asset details

Ad-hoc & sensor assets

Device

Application

Network

Product/business processes

Operational

Physical security

Control systems

Utilities

Financial

Private

Confidential

Billing & mediation

Mobile messaging center

Portals

Web-services

Private Healthcare Information (PHI) database

Cloud based Clinical information system (CIS)

Software

Hardware

Lighting control system

Household security systems

Physical perimeter

Buildings

Distribution monitoring

Vending machines

Freight supply

Automation

Production chain monitoring

eHealth security





Personal security



Road safety

Emission control


Fleet management



Toll payment










Ad-hoc & sensor assets

















Threats






Ad-hoc & sensor threats



Threat Agents


	Motivation	Rationality	Sophistication
CORPORATIONS	Corporate espionage	High	Depends
CYBER CRIMINALS	Financial gain, the hacking itself	Low	High
CYBER TERRORISTS, HACKTIVISTS	Politics, social matters, ideologies	Medium	Medium
SCRIPT KIDDIES	The thrill of danger	Very Low	Low
EMPLOYEES	Unintentional, personal profit	High	High
NATION STATES	Defense, protection of state	High	High
NATURAL DISASTERS	None	None	None

Vulnerabilities and Risks



- Small devices, with low-level of **power independency**
- Devices are scattered in **wide areas**
- **Means** of communication
- Specific **protocol** operations

Vulnerabilities and Risks



Risks

- **Data** loss
- Loss of **devices**
- **Privacy** leakage

Risk Management

- Operational control
- Specialized tools and techniques
- Risk prioritizing, risk data analysis
- Constant monitoring
- Stakeholders feedback and assessment

Good Practices

Categories	Subcategories	Details
Authentication	Specific methods	Authentication methods for RFID Point of Sales (POS)
Data protection	Cryptography	Constrained environments Public key (Ad-hoc networks) Symmetric key (sensor networks)
	Privacy preservation	Health data access control
	Networking	Mechanisms for horizontal handover Dedicated Short-Range Communications (DSRC) applications
	RFID tags	Secure disposal Non-revealing identifier format
Simulation, visualisation and testing activities	Benchmarking	Signal measurement (interference, strength)
	Communication standards	Overclaiming and Misclaiming Attacks

Good Practices

Categories	Subcategories	Details
Monitoring	Audits, alerts and logs	Low-power wearable ECG monitoring system for multiple-patient remote monitoring Resource usage patterns monitoring
	Physical Access	Wi-Fi area RFID tag's range
	Detection tools	Remote Intrusion Monitoring (RIM)
	Resource related	Redundant or loop packet transmission avoidance Decreased power reduction on nodes Vampire attacks prevention Energy Weight Monitoring system
	Special nodes	Sensor clusters monitoring (gNodes) Traffic throughput in clusters (cNodes)

Good Practices

Categories	Subcategories	Details
Management and support	RFID	Back-end server passwords for tags System security of readers and middleware Secure placement of tags and readers Electromagnetic shielded tunnels Critical data identification and access control
	Access Points (AP)	Channel number and power output configuration Avoid default SSID name Maximum beacon time interval ; announcements of position Prevent unauthorized management (i.e. unauthorized resetting) Control access of STAs (device with a wireless interface)
Specialised tools & techniques	Nodes	Positioning of nodes in grid Camouflage or hide sensor nodes Frequent change of the base station
	Generic	Wireless Intrusion Detection Systems (WIDS) Reject unknown received calls/SMS/MMS/e-mails

Good Practices

Categories	Subcategories	Details
Specialised tools & techniques	Routing protocols	Flat-based/Hierarchical-based/Location-based Multipath MAC Protocol (S-MAC , T-MAC , B-MAC or G-MAC) Expected Transmission Count (ETX) with MESH-LINK protocol Geographic Routing Protocol Next Generation Access Control Protocols and API definitions (NGAC-FA , NGAC-GOADS , INCITS 499 , SP 800-178) Ariadne Secure Efficient ad-hoc Distance vector (SEAD) Authenticated Routing for ad-hoc Network (ARAN)
	RFID	Radio frequency shielded sheltering mechanism Tags with a “ press-to-activate ” switch Tag polling in small time intervals

Good Practices

Categories	Subcategories	Details
Specialised tools & techniques	Threat-focused	Lightweight Secure Mechanism Path Based DoS attacks Packet Leash wormhole attacks Limit node neighbours Sybil attacks Spread Spectrum and Cryptographic puzzle external Jamming attacks End-to-end acknowledgements and global time synchronisation Sybil attack, massive flood of replies Gossiping algorithms collisions and messaging costs Secure wakeup and secure bootstrapping DoS attacks (sleep deprivation attacks) Repeated Game Theory and Bayesian Game Theory DoS attacks Signal strength detection and Ant Based Framework DoS attacks Distributed algorithms sinkhole attacks Randomized Multicast or Line-Selected Multicast node replication attacks

Gap Analysis (1)

Device Domain

- *The **sophistication of attacks** is **greater** than the **level of security** that practices offer*

Network Domain

- *WIDS requires **resources***
- *The **time-period** between the **assessment** and the **deployment/withdrawal** of **firmware updates***
- *The **standalone characteristics** of **routing protocols** are not sufficient for **threat protection***

Application Domain

- *Security patches and updates do not mitigate **zero-day exploits***
- ***Cloud-based applications** cannot be safeguarded due to the **complex backend environment***

Gap Analysis (2)

Operational Domain

- *The **human factor** and the **poor video quality** of surveillance systems*
- ***Physical security is limited** when defense-in-depth is implemented*
- ***Fraudulent activities** are addressed only with mechanisms without functional procedures*

Product/Business Processes Domain

- *The **regulations** focus mainly on threats against **data***
- *The **regulations** do not necessarily resolve all the **responsibilities of individuals***
- *The use of **external/customized components** derails **security by design***

Recommendations

Authentication/Authorization

- **Multi-factor** authentication methods (MFA)
- **Certificate-based** authentication
- **Attribute-based** access controls

Proactive Defense

- Orchestration of **WIDS** in every bottleneck
- Continuous **update** of the IDS sensors' **ruleset** in strict time **intervals** and by following **trustful sources** of signatures
- Focus on the **routing protocols** vulnerabilities

Reactive Defense

- A **defense zone** consisting of a **honeynet**

Thank you!

Questions?

Read more at: DOI 10.2824/58281

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